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INTRODUCTION
In his pathbreaking book Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and 
Changing Constitutions, Professor Richard Albert studies the “uncharted terrain” 
of amendment rules. He maps the “intellectual topography of constitutional 
amendment rules” and, at the same time, tries to answer “the many questions 
about amendment that have until now remained unanswered”1. In particular, 
Professor Albert “devote(s) much of the book to a question for which there 
are surprisingly few comprehensive answers in the scholarly literature: how 
should be design the rules of constitutional amendments”2.
The outcome is an elegant, comprehensive and profound study, which draws 
from “comparative, doctrinal, historical, and theoretical perspectives”3. The 
author presents a clear and easy-to-read study, which he illustrates through 
examples of pressing importance that help us understand the enormous rel-
evance of the book’s main theme. Clearly, Albert’s work represents the most 
complete and up-to-date guide for the study of constitutional amendments.
Before proceeding to an examination of the book, let me clarify three points 
about the review that follows. In the first place, I am not going to carry out 
an exhaustive analysis of Constitutional Amendments, but rather focus on a 
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few topics that I consider of particular relevance. Secondly, the critical view 
that I shall assume as my standpoint will be based on a specific theory of 
democracy, namely a “dialogic conception of democracy”. Thirdly, most of 
the examples I shall consider will come from recent Latin American history. 
I believe that these rich regional examples, which do not play a prominent 
role in Professor Albert’s book, may be of great help in order to “test” and 
challenge many of the claims that the author makes thorough the book. 
1. IN PRAISE OF (DEMOCRATIC) THEORY
In the introduction of his book, Professor Albert declares that the two main 
purposes of his work are i) “to inspire interest in constitutional amendment;” 
and ii) “to guide those seeking to understand how constitutions change”4. 
When one finishes reading Constitutional Amendments, it becomes clear that 
the author managed to achieve his main objectives: the book does generate 
interest in constitutional amendment and provides an attractive guide to those 
seeking to understand how constitutional change works. Now, Professor Al-
bert does many other things in his book, besides providing a map for guiding 
legal reformers in the sub-explored territory of constitutional amendments: 
he suggests that “codified unamendability” is a bad idea; he maintains that 
certain forms of judicial review for constitutional amendments are problem-
atic; he discusses the important doctrine of “unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments;” he rejects both “formal rigidity” and “hyper flexibility”; and 
he finally claims that the rules of change should “keep the constitution stable 
and true to popular values yet always changeable when necessary”5 . 
I tend to agree with most of Albert’s opinions in these matters, although it 
is difficult to properly see where these opinions derive from. As his celebrated 
Edmund Burke could have put it: we need his judgements rather than his 
opinions on the matter. In other words, we need Professor Albert to articulate 
the theory that is “doing the work” behind his important suggestions and 
critiques.6 Unfortunately, it is not easy to find the theoretical sources that 
give support to such claims, because the author never clearly reveals what 
the theoretical foundations of his work are. As a result of this, by the end of 
the book, we get an excellent map of the “uncharted terrain” of constitutional 
amendments, but we remain with few reasons to go one way or the other. 
Therefore –I would suggest– Professor Albert needs to present more clearly 
4 Ibid., p. 36.
5 Ibid., p. 271.
6 Paraphrasing Ronald Dworkin (and Kant) I would say that a comparative study of 
amendments “without theory is blind […] (a comparative study may become) a way of stating 
a conclusion, not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the real work” (dworKin, ronald. 
In praise of theory. In: Arizona State Law Journal, n.° 353, 1997, p. 372).
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what the theoretical foundations of his views are. More particularly –I would 
add– the author needs to tell us what his understanding of democracy is. 
In fact, democratic theory seems indispensable, not only with regard to 
the more general and fundamental questions in the area (say, where does the 
legitimacy of a Constitution come from? Can the “old generations” limit the 
“new ones”? Can a democratically adopted Constitution be reformed and, in 
that case, under what requirements?),7 but also, and more significantly, re-
garding the problems Professor Albert is more concerned about (i.e., matters 
related to amendability and unamendability; judicial review of amendments; 
alternatives to judicial review; etc.). 
Trying to contribute to this important theoretical enterprise, in what fol-
lows I shall approach to Constitutional Amendments with the help of a par-
ticular view of democracy, which can be characterized by two fundamental 
features, namely i) its “dialogic” content, and ii) its contextual character. Let 
me briefly explain each of those features.
i) A theory of democracy. The theory of democracy that I shall here consider is 
(a specific version of) a dialogic or deliberative approach. As we all know, there 
is a long discussion concerning the meaning, scope, implications and virtues 
of deliberative democracy, but at this point I will only refer to certain aspects 
of that complex discussion8. According to the understanding of democracy that 
I shall here assume, public decisions gain justification when they are adopted 
after an ample process of collective discussion with all those potentially af-
fected9. In other words, for this version of deliberative democracy, democracy 
is based on two fundamental pillars, namely discussion and social inclusion. 
As Habermas put it, in a recent interview, the procedure of a deliberative de-
mocracy “requires, on the one hand, the inclusion of all of those affected by 
the democratic decisions and, on the other, it makes these decisions dependent 
on the more or less discursive character of the preceding deliberations”10.
7 A good example of such an approach may be found in elster, jon, slaGstad, rune. 
Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. In particular, 
see Holmes, stepHen. “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” in elster, jon, slaGstad, 
rune. Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
8 BoHman, james. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Cambridge: 
mit Press, 1996, BoHman, james, reHG, william (eds.). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: mit 
Press, 1997, elster, jon (ed.). Deliberative democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, Gutmann, amy & tHompson, dennis. Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004, HaBermas, jurGen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory on Law and Democracy. Cambridge: mit Press, 1996, nino, carlos. The Constitution of 
Deliberative Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
9 HaBermas, jurGen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
on Law and Democracy. Cambridge: mit Press, 1996.
10 HaBermas, jurGen. “Interview with Jurgen Habermas,” in BacHtiGer, andre, dryzeK, 
joHn et al., The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018, p. 873.
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I understand that, for some scholars, the regulatory ideal of a “dialogic 
democracy” may result too demanding and too abstract. In my opinion, 
however, such ideal only refines some intuitions we all have about what is 
required of a decision to be considered a justified decision. We find a good 
example of what I am saying in the same book under examination. In fact, 
in different passages of Constitutional Amendments, Professor Albert seems 
to suggest that his work is founded on a certain theory of democracy, which 
seems closely related to what I called a dialogic or deliberative theory of 
democracy. For instance, he admits that a constitutional change is more dif-
ficult to justify when it has been carried out “without sufficient deliberation 
or popular support”11; and praises certain “alternative” forms of judicial 
review of amendments “built on the theory of democratic dialogue”12, which 
he presents and defends as a variation on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
for the judicial review of statutes”13. 
He even closes the book with a section dedicated to democracy, and makes 
a particular statement saying that the decision to amend the constitution 
should reflect “the considered judgment of the community and the socio-
logical legitimacy that only deliberative procedures can confer”14. All these 
are crucial claims about crucial questions through which Professor Albert 
shows his clear sympathies towards a dialogic theory of democracy. This is 
important, although –I submit– his views about democratic theory should be 
made more explicit, and then refined and strengthened. In that way, I believe, 
his approach to the topic of constitutional amendments would gain a lot –as 
I will try to demonstrate– in both its capacity to understand and critically 
evaluate the present situation on the matter.
ii) An historically situated approach. Let me now examine the second ele-
ment that characterizes my theoretical standpoint, namely its contextual 
sensitivity. As anticipated, the selected dialogic theory will be informed by 
the “dramas” that characterize the present historical moment. This historical 
situation –I submit– can be characterized by the presence of a renewed and 
unprecedented crisis affecting the heart of the traditional system of “checks 
and balances”: I am referring to the (so-called) problem of “democratic ero-
sion.” Of course, a proper discussion of the issue results impossible at this 
point, but for the limited purposes of this review, it may suffice to say the 
following. There seems to be a widespread agreement among political theo-
rists and constitutional doctrinaires about the fact that we are going through 
11 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 221-2.
12 Ibid., p. 223.
13 Ibid., p. 223.
14 Ibid., p. 270.
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a particularly severe and profound democratic crisis15. Scholars have referred 
to this phenomenon in different ways (i.e., “democratic erosion”; “democratic 
backsliding”; “democratic fatigue”; “democratic extortion”) but they all 
seem to agree on the depth and breadth of a crisis that does not seem easy to 
overcome through traditional methods. 
In the book they dedicated to the topic of “democratic erosion”, Ginsburg 
and Huq have distinguished between “authoritarian collapse”, which they 
present as “a rapid, wholesale turn away from democracy,” and “democratic 
erosion”, which they describe as “the risk of slow, but ultimately substantial 
unraveling along the margins of rule-of-law, democratic, and liberal rights”16. 
“Democratic erosion” would imply a “process of incremental but ultimately 
still substantial, decay in the three basic predicates of democracy – competitive 
elections, liberal rights to speech and association and the rule of law, across 
different institutions, against a baseline of some ingoing level of democracy”.17-18 
Having this theoretical perspective in mind, we can now go back to the 
topic of constitutional amendments and re-examine some of Professor Albert’s 
main claims. As we shall see, this reinvigorated democratic approach may help 
us to greatly improve our study of constitutional amendments. In fact, when 
we begin to think of constitutional amendments as deliberative practices that 
concern the entire citizenry, some of the main aspects of Professor Albert’s 
analysis on the subject begin to change. For example, the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendments needs now to be completely revised in 
order to ensure that that review of constitutionality does not remain under the 
15 GinsBurG, tom; HuQ, aziz. How to save a Constitutional Democracy. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2018, GraBer, marK, levinson, sanford, tusHnet, marK, eds. 
Constitutional democracy in crisis? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, levitsKy, steven, 
ziBlatt, daniel. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown, 2018, przeworsKi, adam. Crises 
of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
16 Years ago, the emergency powers and military coups were important to “fast democratic 
breakdowns,” which usually yielded to “a clearly authoritarian form of government.” In contrast, 
the “slow erosion” of democracy would constitute the more common phenomenon of our time 
–a phenomenon that usually ends up with “some kind of competitive authoritarian structure” 
(GinsBurG, tom; HuQ, aziz. How to save a Constitutional Democracy. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2018, p. 39). Summarizing a central part of their approach, Ginsburg & Huq 
state: “In the last decade of the twentieth century, liberal democracy seemed to have triumphed 
everywhere. Yet today there is increasing concern that the form of democracy provides a façade 
for undemocratic behavior” (Ibid., p. 9).
17 Ibid., p. 43-4.
18 On the positive side, this dramatic scenario is forcing us to consider democratic al-
ternatives that we should have taken seriously long time ago –alternatives that those of us who 
advocate for democratic dialogue have frequently defended. I am here thinking about citizens’ 
assemblies; town meetings; and other forms of direct forms of democratic participation and delib-
eration (alternatives that fit perfectly well with the dialogic principle that says that the democratic 
dialogue should be carried out by “all those potentially affected”, HaBermas, jurGen. Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Law and Democracy. Cambridge: mit 
Press, 1996). 
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exclusive control of the judicial apparatus. Also, in this way, the “alternatives 
to judicial invalidation” explored by Albert gain sense and force19; and the 
same happens with the “deliberation requirements” that he studies in Chapter 
520. On the other hand, distinctions such as the one that Professor Albert pro-
poses, between amendments and dismemberments, need now be qualified or 
complexed, so to take into account the levels of citizen discussion on which 
they are based, or which they come to promote; etc. I shall come back to 
many of these points later. Meanwhile, let me begin the critical examination 
of the book, by first focusing on the crucial differentiation the author makes 
between “amendments” and “dismemberments”.
2. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN AMENDMENTS AND DISMEMBERMENTS
According to the Professor Albert, the distinction between “amending” and 
“dismembering” the Constitution represents the “foundational distinction” 
upon which his entire book is based21. He summarizes this distinction by 
stating that an amendment “keeps the constitution coherent with itself but 
a dismemberment marks a fundamental break with the core commitments 
or presuppositions of the constitution”22. A constitutional dismemberment 
–he suggests– “alters one or more of the constitution’s essential features –a 
fundamental right, a load-bearing structure, or a core feature of the identity 
of a constitution”. 23 It “alters or fills the void that exist in the conventional 
theory of constitutional change between an amendment and a new actual 
constitution”24. The distinction –he assumes– may help constitutional designers 
to “create different procedures for amending the constitution and others for 
dismembering it”25. In different ways, the distinction between amendments 
and dismemberments has been revised and challenged by scholars of differ-
ent provenience26. Herein, I want to suggest some additional problems that I 
find in this “foundational” distinction and its main implications.
19 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 222.
20 Ibid., p. 204.
21 Ibid., p. 262.
22 Ibid., p. 262.
23 Ibid., p. 85. 
24 Ibid., p. 85.
25 Ibid., 263.
26 Bernal, carlos. On Constitutional Dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
Symposium: Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.
yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/, landau, david. Rescuing the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment 
Doctrine: A Reply to Richard Albert. Yale Journal of International Law, Symposium: Constitu-
tional Amendment and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/, 
roznai, yaniv. Constitutional Amendment and “Fundamendment”: A Response to Professor 
Richard Albert. Yale Journal of International Law, Symposium: Constitutional Amendment and 
Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/.
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i) An imperfect distinction. One initial thing I would suggest is that Albert’s 
distinction between “amending” and “dismembering” the Constitution is 
not sufficiently clear. Consequently, his distinction may be unable to help 
us when trying to understand and classify some common phenomena within 
constitutionalism. Consider the following example (which was, by the way, 
the first case in which I thought when I wanted to “test” this “foundational” 
distinction), namely the remarkable wave of constitutional reforms that took 
place in Latin America during the first half of the 20th Century. During those 
years, most constitutions in the region were modified in order to introduce 
one crucial change in the prevailing texts, namely a list of social, economic 
and cultural rights. This (usually long) list of social rights was added to the 
traditional –and liberal– Bill of Rights, which all those constitutions had 
already adopted. These changes inaugurated a new stage of regional consti-
tutionalism: a period of so-called “social constitutionalism”. The problem 
is that, depending on how one reads those reforms, they could be classified 
either as amendments or as dismemberments.
Recall that, for Albert, an amendment “properly defined […] keeps the al-
tered constitution coherent with its pre-change identity, rights, and structure”27, 
while a constitutional dismemberment “alters one or more of the constitu-
tion’s essential features –a fundamental right, a load-bearing structure, or a 
core feature of the identity of the constitution”28 –it “makes violence” to the 
constitution. Taking into account those criteria, how should one classify the 
social rights reforms? Were them amendments or dismemberments? Let me 
briefly explore both alternatives, using Professor Albert’s favored criteria. 
On the one hand –one could argue– the coming of “social constitutionalism” 
kept the altered constitutions coherent: those reforms did not “make violence” 
to the pre-existing constitutional order. In most cases, the old constitutions were 
preserved fundamentally intact, while just one, crucial aspect of them, was 
changed –and changed in a way that “improved” the previous documents without 
“destroying” them. Let me illustrate the specific situation I am thinking about 
through the specific example of Argentina’s 1853 Constitution, and its 1957 
reform. In 1957, Argentina promoted a constitutional reform, which implied 
the incorporation of article 14 bis. This was a long article, which transformed 
the 1853 constitution in a substantive way: through the incorporation of article 
14 bis, the constitution became a “social”, rather than a liberal constitution.29 
27 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 84.
28 Ibid., p. 85.
29 Section 14bis. states “Labor in its several forms shall be protected by law, which shall 
ensure to workers: dignified and equitable working conditions; limited working hours; paid rest 
and vacations; fair remuneration; minimum vital and adjustable wage; equal pay for equal work; 
participation in the profits of enterprises, with control of production and collaboration in the man-
agement; protection against arbitrary dismissal; stability of the civil servant; free and democratic 
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In a way –one could claim– this amendment (and here I quote Professor Al-
bert) “continues the constitution-making project initiated at the founding”30. 
Precisely for this reason, nobody (no single legal authority or scholar) has ever 
read the 1957 reform as a “constitutional breakdown” or claimed that the old 
1853 constitution resulted in that way “unmade”– even though the introduced 
change modified the “nature” of the constitution substantially.31 
On the other hand, one could claim, the coming of “social constitutional-
ism” did represent a constitutional “dismemberment” –at least, if one took 
into consideration some other suggestions that are present in the book. Let 
me quote Professor Albert again. In his view, a “dismemberment” modifies 
the constitution in a substantive way “by remaking the constitution’s identity, 
repealing or reworking a fundamental right, or destroying and rebuilding a 
central structural pillar of the constitution”32 . So, what to say now about 
“social constitutionalism”? The fact is that, after the introduction of social 
rights, the old constitutions’ “identity” was actually changed: the old “liberal” 
constitutions were transformed into “social” constitutions. Moreover, the list 
of “fundamental rights” was totally re-worked, and “a central structural pillar 
of the constitution” (the entire structure of rights) was substantially altered. 
This is to say, by taking Professor Albert’s words seriously, one could end 
up stating one thing or the contrary, in what regards the changes introduced 
by incorporating social rights into the constitution. 
The above example suggests that the book’s “foundational distinction” 
between “amendments” and “dismemberments” is less clear than desired. 
Obviously, these imperfections become more significant when and if we 
want to use such distinction in order to ground the rest of our analysis –or a 
significant part of it (as the book does). In Constitutional Amendments, the 
distinction between the two categories is in fact crucial (“foundational”) for 
a number of purposes, such as validating or challenging the validity of a cer-
tain reform; or suggesting different kinds of (judicial) controls depending on 
labor union organizations recognized by the mere registration in a special record. Trade unions 
are hereby guaranteed: the right to enter into collective labor bargains; to resort to conciliation 
and arbitration; the right to strike. Union representatives shall have the guarantees necessary for 
carrying out their union tasks and those related to the stability of their employment. The State 
shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an integral nature and may not be 
waived. In particular, the laws shall establish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in 
charge of national or provincial entities with financial and economic autonomy, administered by 
the interested parties with State participation, with no overlapping of contributions; adjustable 
retirements and pensions; full family protection; protection of homestead; family allowances and 
access to a worthy housing.”
30 alBert, ricHard. Op. cit., p. 79.
31 I am bracketing the procedural problems that characterized the 1957 reform, which we 
do not need to consider for the purposes of this argument.
32 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 78.
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whether we were facing an amendment or a dismemberment. In any case, let 
me stop here for the moment, and turn to a different problem that I recognize 
in Professor Albert’s book.
ii) Lack of critical power. Even though the author has, and at different points 
expresses, strong opinions on many of the subjects he studies in Constitu-
tional Amendments (a summary of these opinions can be found in the last 
chapter of his book) it seems clear to me that the main point of the book was 
to present a very rich descriptive analysis of constitutional amendments (the 
“uncharted terrain”). Albert’s choice is certainly irreproachable, although it 
may be insufficient for the study of the “use and misuse” of amendments, 
or the examination of the “validity” of a certain amendment (and the author 
dedicates numerous pages to the study of the “validity of amendments”): 
those evaluations require firmer normative grounds.
In particular, I would suggest, his work has insufficient critical bite, and in 
this sense may be unable to detect and challenge some of the most common 
deficiencies affecting modern constitutionalism. Consider, for instance, the 
following example, also coming from Latin Americas’ constitutional history. 
Between 1991 and 2005, ten Latin American countries reformed their 
constitutions in order to change the rules governing presidential re-election 
(and three changed them twice). In almost all those cases, the amendments 
brought with them less restrictive reelection rules33. Constitutional changes, 
at that time, were (in most cases) either directed at allowing presidential 
re-election, or at making immediate reelection possible (i. e., in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela). Not 
surprisingly, in many occasions, those changes came to favor the incumbent 
president. In other words, those constitutional reforms were directed, al-
most exclusively, to benefit the political class who promoted them. In fact, 
many of these changes did not reserve even the slightest space to matters 
of common, public interest (say, favor future generations or develop a new 
collective project). Those reforms should be considered the expected and 
unfortunate product of our degraded and eroded democracies: they offer us 
a clear example of the way in which the traditional controlling devices of the 
constitution have been “captured” and used by elites and interest groups, for 
their own benefit. In the face of such pathologies, the distinction between 
“amendments” and “dismemberment” does not come to our help. Perhaps, 
after investigation, we recognize that the majority of those reforms represented 
amendments that were in line with a long history –an unhappy tradition– of 
33 landau, david. Constituent Power and Constitution-Making in Latin America in Le-
rner, Hanna, Landau, David. eds. Comparative Constitution-Making, Edward Elgar Press, 2019, 
neGretto, GaBriel. Making Constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, Gar-
Garella, roBerto. Latin American Constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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erratic constitutional reforms. Or not. But, again, in those circumstances it 
may be unhelpful to engage into those questions and disquisitions (“Was 
this reform a proper amendment, or was it, instead, a dismemberment?”). In 
those difficult circumstances, we need to be able to explain constitutional 
designers why certain institutional reforms (i. e., a reform directed at allowing 
presidential reelection; or –more generally– reforms that tended to “seriously 
[…] curtail the operation of those political processes” –as it was maintained 
in Carolene Products’ famous footnote 4) should be subjected to more ex-
acting collective scrutiny –and perhaps confronted through political means.
The point is that Professor Albert’s approach does not seem to be particularly 
sensitive to the problem of “democratic erosion” –in other words, it does not 
appear to be well prepared to detect and critically examine these developments, 
which represent the most serious threat faced by contemporary democratic 
systems. Following James Madison’s teachings, my suggestion would then 
be: we should approach to questions of institutional design by having in mind 
the most serious risks affecting our public life (i.e., the problem of “factions”, 
during the “founding period”; the problem of “democratic erosion”, in our 
time). More specifically, we need to be able to understand and explain why, 
at this time, certain constitutional amendments should be resisted.
iii) The question about judicial review of constitutional amendments. 
A third question that I want to raise concerns the place that Albert’s book 
reserves to the judicial review of constitutional amendments. My point is, 
again, that in a context marked by “democratic erosion”, our analysis should 
not be neutral –it should not be the same kind of analysis we could have 
developed when we assumed that the system of “checks and balances” was 
functioning quite well. In other words, at this time, our presumption should 
not be that the branches will tend control the excesses of each other (as if 
the different branches had similar powers/ as if the members of the different 
branches had opposite interests), but rather that they will tend to serve each 
other (given that one branch gained much more power than the others/ given 
that the members of different branches had too many interests in common). 
In fact: what reasons do we have, at this time, to be deferent towards the 
judiciary, when the “separation” between the political and judicial branches 
has been undermined? Why should we trust, in principle, judicial decisions 
related to the separation of powers, when (the rule seems to be that) many 
of the most prominent members of the judiciary seem to share the interests 
of the Executive Branch?
Let me illustrate the kinds of situations I am thinking about by resorting, 
again, to an example derived from recent Latin American history. The case 
that I want to consider comes from Bolivia 2016, when then President Evo 
Morales lost a referendum that he himself had promoted, in order to modify 
the Constitution and thus gain authorization to run for office for a fourth term. 
Remarkably, the Plurinational Constitutional Court, after a demand set by 
381Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions… 
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 48, enero-abril de 2021, pp. 371-389
Morales’ Movement to Socialism (MAS) party, decided, on a November 20th, 
2017 unanimous verdict34 that limits barring elected authorities from seeking 
re-election indefinitely, entered in conflict with the American Convention on 
Human Rights and thus violated human rights. In the words of Macario Lahor 
Cortez, head of the Plurinational Court, “All people that were limited by the 
law and the constitution are hereby able to run for office, because it is up to the 
Bolivian people to decide.” So, what we have here is a failed political attempt 
to amend the Constitution, which was finally obtained through a (shameful) 
judicial decision, promoted by a (politically dependent) Constitutional Court. 
Of course, I do not mean to imply that these situations represent the dominant 
pattern in our time, or even in Latin America. What I suggest, instead, is that 
these kinds of examples do not anymore constitute the extreme exception –the 
exception that may only emerge in exotic countries or bizarre circumstances. 
In this new political context defined by “democratic erosion”, we should 
not act as if we were living in the ideal world of the “checks and balances”. 
In other words, we should not develop our institutional analysis (our “new 
topography”) by having in mind the “old pictures” of the explored territory. 
In chapter 5 of his book, Professor Albert refers, for instance, to the “many 
institutional design options” that constitutional designers “have at their disposal 
if they wish to confer upon courts the power to review constitutional changes”35. 
Now, if we took into consideration the serious institutional problems that we 
explored in previous sections, we should be more cautious about those kinds 
of recommendations. Being aware of the “dramas” of our time, my suggestion 
would be to help constitutional designers to prevent the development of new 
and foreseeable institutional calamities (again, in the same way that Madison 
helped his generation to prevent the threats posed by factions). Many of those 
“institutional design options” at our “disposal” may result unsuitable or simply 
inadvisable at our time –and we must able to state it, loud and clear.
3. CAN THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS SAVE US?
In Chapter 5 of his book, Professor Albert critically examines the influential 
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments (duca), as a potential 
response to the problems posed by illegal amendments. In line with the previ-
ous analysis, I would recommend being more cautious about this significant 
doctrine and its noble promises.
According to the doctrine of unconstitutional amendments (and here I 
will follow Professor Albert’s own description of it) “the people,” in charge 
of the “constituent power” has created a constitution, and also “constituted 
34 tcp Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional n.° 0084/2017.
35 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 264.
382 Roberto Gargarella
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 48, enero-abril de 2021, pp. 371-389
powers” who are required to act in the people’s name consistent with the 
constitution. Taking into account those assumptions, then “the judicial act of 
striking down a transformative change” can be deemed a justifiable interven-
tion to safeguard the terms of the original bargain approved by the people”36. 
Despite representing “an example of what Ran Hirschl has labeled the ‘ju-
dicialization of mega-politics” –he suggests– such judicial decision could 
not be deemed offensive to democracy37. Rather, it must be recognized as “a 
triumph of democracy”38. To declare a constitutional amendment unconstitu-
tional may represent a way of ensuring that the will of the people, expressed 
in the constitution, prevails against the transient will of their representatives.
Now, what would justify the reasoning behind the duca? More particu-
larly: i) what would justify the sharp distinction upon which the doctrine is 
based (namely the distinction between the “original” and “derived” will of 
the people); and ii) what would justify the interpretative powers and capaci-
ties that the duca attributes to the judicial branch? In the particular version 
of the doctrine that Professor Albert examines in his book –basically, Yaniv 
Roznai’s39 view– the justificatory work is based on Sieyes’ controversial 
distinction between “constituent” and “constituted” powers.40 This original 
distinction, however, is extremely polemical and –not surprisingly– tends to 
translates its own problems to the doctrine of unconstitutional amendments, 
as we shall explore.41-42 
36 Ibid., p. 217.
37 Ibid., p. 218.
38 Ibid., p. 217.
39 roznai, yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017. 
40 Thus, as it was presented in 1789 by the Abbe Sieyes, in his political pamphlet ‘Qu’est-ce 
qui le tier-etat?’ (sieyes, emmanuel. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes: The Essential Political Writings 
(Studies in the History of Political Thought. Brill: Lam Edition, 2014.). In my view, the entire 
theoretical machinery –the “machinery” that is required in order to maintain what the duca main-
tains– had been articulated centuries ago in the American context. In my view, the logic behind the 
doctrine of unconstitutional amendments is basically identical to the one that Alexander Hamilton 
famously introduced in Federalist Papers 78. At that time, Hamilton did the same two things 
that the doctrine of unconstitutional amendments wants to do, namely i) justify the special force 
and particular character of the constitution through a “democratic” argument (in this way, the 
constitution is identified with the will of the people); and ii) justify the judicial role in invalidating 
infra-constitutional decisions in the name of the constitution and democracy. Now, if we accept 
that the reasoning behind both views is basically similar, both the Hamiltonian approach and the 
logic of the doctrine of unconstitutional amendments end up sharing similar problems, beginning 
from the fact that they presume a rather weak understanding of democracy. 
41 Bernal, carlos. On Constitutional Dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
Symposium: Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.
yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/
42 For instance, as Conall Towe has recently put it, “constituent power theory cannot 
justify doctrines of implicit constitutional unamendability because it is inherently paradoxical. 
Under the constituent/constituted distinction, powers of constitutional amendment exist as the 
latter – they flow from the constitution and are thus limited by it. However, if constituent power is 
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As far as I see it, the theoretical problems affecting the duca appear at both 
the above-mentioned levels. On the one hand, there seems to be an extremely 
weak connection between what we may designate as the “absolute” or “sov-
ereign” “will of the people” and the will of those politicians who actually 
write a constitution –a problem that seems aggravated the closer we examine 
how constitutions tend to be written.43 Usually, constitutions are written by 
just a few, who claim to represent the people at large. This situation generates 
all the obvious risks that were for instance studied by Jon Elster in his book 
Ulysses Unbound, which he summarized in the idea that “in politics, people 
never try to bind themselves, only to bind others”.4445 Recall, for instance, 
the case of the American “founding fathers”, when they shielded the issue of 
slavery in the Federal Assembly, or –more recently– the case of Spain, when 
the political class decided to entrench “the entire slate of rules concerning 
the Crown”46. In such situations (and the examples that I chose refer to two 
of the most significant constitutional assemblies in the World’s history) one 
does not easily recognize the presence of the “sovereign will” of the people, 
but rather finds something quite different, which very much resembles the 
particular interests of the members of the convention themselves. This is 
why –I submit– those decisions –like many other similar ones, coming from 
similar, foundational constitutional assemblies– should be read, more and 
more, with prudence and skepticism, if not directly with some suspicion.
On the other hand, there are no reasons for simply assuming the existence 
of a relevant connection between the meaning of the constitution (whatever 
truly an all-powerful extra-legal force without confine, then why can it not be exercised through 
amendment process? Logically, this is a contradiction – either the constituent power is absolute 
(and can be exercised through the amendment process) or it is not (and thus cannot be exercised 
through the amendment process). If the subjects of a constitution want to amend a part of it, 
then why must they make a new Constitution instead of using the amendment process?” (towe, 
conall. Constituent Power and Doctrines of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. 
Trinity College Law Review’s Joint Edition in Constitutional Law Series, 2019.). 
43 Let me make clear, however, that a dialogic approach to democracy neither requires nor 
implies a repudiation of the idea of an extraordinary and unlimited “constituent’ power” (a “con-
stituent power” in the hands of “the people,” representing “an extra-legal power with no confines”). 
In fact, something like the “ideal speech situation”, presented by Jurgen Habermas in his work, 
may play a similar role, as a regulative idea that helps us to critically examine the value of actual 
constitutional agreements.
44 elster, jon. Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. ix.
45 Moreover, for those of us who distinguish a decision as “democratic” only when it has 
been the result of a “dialogue” among “all those potentially affected”, most Constitutions do not 
rank well as “democratic acts”, even in the case the document has been ratified (after the work 
of the Constituent Assembly) by majority vote: first, such processes of popular ratification are 
usually very poor in terms of collective deliberation, and second –and most significantly– they 
force people to limit their judgement to just say “yes” or “no” –“yes” or “no” to the hundreds 
of topics and problems presented by a constitutional reform. 
46 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 192.
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that meaning is) and the peculiar reading that judges may present about the 
constitution. And this would be so for numerous reasons, including problems 
related to the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary;47 the presence of infinite 
difficulties related to constitutional interpretation;48 motivational problems 
that the book does not examine (i.e., why would judges be motivated to act 
in the desired way?); and also functional problems, such as the ones that 
Professor Albert aptly recognizes in his book.49 In sum, two of the main 
pillars upon which the duca is based (related to the “sovereign will of the 
people” and the powers/capacities of the judicial branch) seem to be much 
more fragile than required.50
Things become more promising, however, if –instead of simply following 
the “doctrine of unconstitutional amendments”– we focus on the “alterna-
tives to (judicial) invalidation” that Professor Albert explores at the end of 
Chapter 5. At that point, Albert proposes (but unfortunately does not develop) 
“alternative” forms of judicial review of amendments, “built on the theory 
of democratic dialogue”. According to such alternatives, a court could “de-
clare an amendment incompatible with its own reading of the constitution, 
though the effect of its declaration would be purely advisory with no binding 
legal consequence”51. This possibility (which he describes as “catalytic, not 
obstructive”) would “put judges into conversation with reformers to invite 
them to have a second look at the amendment”.52This alternative to invalida-
tion –Professor Albert suggests– would be a variation on the design of the 
47 The problems that appear in this respect are numerous, and have been routinely exam-
ined by legal scholars, at least since the emergence of Alexander Bickel crucial study. As Bickel 
famously stated, when courts declare a law invalid, what in fact happens is that they thwart “the 
will of the representatives of the actual people of the here and now,” thus exercising control “not 
in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it” (BicKel, alexander. The Least Dangerous 
Branch. Conn: Yale University Press, 1962, p. 17).
48 To say the least: in the context of plural, multicultural societies, marked by the “fact of 
disagreement”, why should judges play such a decisive (if not final) role, in the resolution of our 
most fundamental, constitutional disagreements? (waldron, jeremy. Law and Disagreement. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
49 For instance, when he states: “the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amend-
ment can be useful in the defense of democracy, but it is susceptible to misapplication, just as 
any other judicial doctrine”, alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, 
and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 221.
50 It is important to note that the problem we face is not one that may disappear by saying, 
for instance, that the more the constituent assembly resembles the primary constituent power, 
the less it should be constrained, and vice versa. The problem is “categorical”. More precisely, 
fundamental constitutional matters need to be decided, examined and re-examined through 
collective dialogic agreements. And this is not something that the “doctrine” gives us: judicial 
decisions cannot reproduce or “mimic”, in any significant way, a collective conversation among 
the people –this is to say, a collective dialogue where the citizenry plays the central role.
51 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 223.
52 Ibid., p. 223.
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United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
for the judicial review of statutes53.
As anticipated, I tend to agree with Professor Albert in what concerns this 
“alternative to invalidation”. Nevertheless, I want to add a minor comment 
about it: for a dialogic view, the “conversational” review of amendments 
should not remain restricted to a dialogue between the different branches of 
government, as in the model that seems to be here proposed. By contrast, the 
dialogue that courts need to promote must include, in a special and central 
way, the participation of the entire citizenry. In other words, a dialogue that 
is, in the best case, restricted to the different branches of power, or a dialogue 
between “technical” and weekly representative public officers (like a dialogue 
between elites), does not satisfy the requirements of a robust dialogic theory. 
In our plural, multicultural societies, a proper collective conversation needs 
to have the people at large at the center and as the main actor –particularly 
when democracies are affected, as our democracies are, by a profound crisis 
of representation.
4. CODA: DEMOCRACY AND A  
“HIERARCHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE”
In this book, like in previous work, Professor Albert explored alternatives 
to codified unamendability, through an escalating system of constitutional 
change. This system would provide special protection to fundamental con-
stitutional values by requiring significant procedural efforts to alter them54. 
He also suggests “codifying an escalating structure of restricted amendment 
pathways to make some constitutional rules harder to amend than others 
yet without insulating any of them from formal change”55. The proposal, he 
claims, has at least two positive benefits. First, it “achieves the same expres-
sive function as unamendability, identifying for all to see what is thought to 
be most integral in the polity.” Second, the system “needs not limit itself to 
two levels of amendment difficulty”56. What emerges –he concludes– is a 
“hierarchy of constitutional importance, with some parts or principles of the 
constitution assigned to amendment procedures and others to dismemberment 
procedures”57. From the viewpoint I have defended in previous pages, Albert’s 
proposal sounds also interesting. As he himself remarks, the escalating system 
53 GardBaum, stepHen. The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
54 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Handcuffs. Arizona State Law Journal 42: 663, 2010, 
alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment. 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 2018.
55 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Con-
stitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 201.
56 Ibid, p. 201.
57 Ibid., p. 263.
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results in principle attractive from a democratic perspective: the assumption 
is that codified unamendability improperly limits the range of options that a 
reasonable democratic community should have.
Now, what if constitutional amendment rules were not tiered? In recent 
work, Albert has suggested the adoption of a “mutuality rule” that requires 
that the procedure to be used to change fundamental constitutional values 
should be basically equivalent to the procedure that brought the existing 
constitutional norms into being. In addition, he proposes a “constructive” 
and advisory, rather than prohibitive judicial role, in the analysis of those 
amendments58. Contrary to what Professor Albert maintains, David Landau 
finds these alternatives to be closely related to the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional constitutional amendments that he defends –he actually claims that 
they are “fairly close relatives”59. In Landau’s words, this doctrine “allows 
courts to develop a relatively crude form of tiering inferred from the consti-
tution by effectively requiring that certain changes to the “basic structure” 
or “core values” go through a constitution-making process, rather than using 
the normal amendment rules”60. In that sense, “it often satisfies (Albert’s) 
mutuality criterion”61.
From the perspective that I have here defended –and considering the con-
text of political elitism, “democratic erosion”, and “democratic capture” that 
we have described in previous pages– none of those ideas results particularly 
promising. In fact, for political leaders (or members of a political elite) who 
have managed to gain control of the institutional structure, the proposed 
requirements seem extremely easy to overcome –almost a joke. Within the 
existing and restrictive democratic processes, the gathering of a Constitutional 
Convention or the call for a ratifying plebiscite seems does not appear as 
serious problems. The same goes, again, for the doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments62, and other theories that rely on the capacities of 
the judicial branch. In this respect, examples like the one of Colombia and the 
Constitutional Court’s decision that prevented Alvaro Uribe’s re-election seem 
58 alBert, ricHard. Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment. 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 
1, 2018, landau, david. Rescuing the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine: A 
Reply to Richard Albert. Yale Journal of International Law, Symposium: Constitutional Amend-
ment and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/.
59 landau, david. Rescuing the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine: A 
Reply to Richard Albert. Yale Journal of International Law, Symposium: Constitutional Amend-
ment and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 landau, david. Rescuing the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine: A 
Reply to Richard Albert. Yale Journal of International Law, Symposium: Constitutional Amendment 
and Dismemberment, 2018. Available in: https://www.yjil.yale.edu/2018/02/, dixon, rosalind & 
landau, david. Tiered Constitutional Design, George Washington Law Review, vol. 86, 2017.
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more the exception than the rule63. In Latin America at least, and particularly 
in the context of “captured” democracies, Supreme or Constitutional Courts 
tend to become the main ally of the President, as the shameful examples of 
Venezuela, Ecuador or, more recently, Bolivia (see above), demonstrates. 
From the perspective of a robust dialogic theory, historically situated, 
what should actually matter is the depth and breadth of the constitutional 
agreement– more precisely, the inclusive and deliberative character of the 
collective, constitutional accord, and not the fact that the changes complied 
with certain legal formalisms that seem easy to obtain in the context of our 
degraded democracies.64 The regulative ideal that I have here proposed would 
help us to abandon many of the presumptions that distinguish Professor Al-
bert’s work –either presumptions in favor of the stability of the constitutional 
agreement, or presumptions in favor of the original constitutional agreement 
(particularly, but not only, in light of the limited democratic legitimacy that 
characterizes many of the old constitutions that are still in place).
In the previous pages, I took some initial steps in the exploration of 
Professor Richard Albert’s book Constitutional Amendments, and critically 
examined some of the points I considered most salient in this work. I do not 
want to conclude these comments, however, without congratulating the author 
again for the magnificent work he has done, which undoubtedly establishes 
a “before and after” in the study of constitutional amendments.
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